Lessons from Ukraine’s 2023 Summer Counteroffensive – A Year Later

The Ambitious Plan

Ukraine’s counteroffensive was conceived in September 2022, following the successful Kharkiv counteroffensive that saw Russian forces retreat across a significant portion of Ukrainian territory. The plan for the summer of 2023 was equally ambitious. Ukraine aimed to use three armored brigades to pin down Russian forces in the east, while three more brigades would break through Russian defensive lines in the south. The ultimate goal was to capture the city of Tokmak within seven days and then push southward toward Melitopol and the coast.

However, the reality on the ground was starkly different. Instead of rapid advances, Ukrainian forces stalled after months of fighting around the village of Robotyne. The anticipated quick capture of Tokmak turned into a prolonged struggle, and the counteroffensive, in every sense of the word, became a failure.

Why the Plan Failed

The reasons for the failure of the 2023 summer counteroffensive are complex and multifaceted. Here, we break down the key factors that contributed to its downfall.

1. Lack of Experienced Troops

One of the most significant issues highlighted by the RUSI report was Ukraine’s lack of experienced troops. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 resulted in staggering casualties for Kyiv’s forces. According to the report, by the end of 2022, Ukraine had lost approximately 30,000 soldiers—an astronomical figure for a modern European army. Many of these losses were concentrated among Ukraine’s professional military brigades, which had been on the front lines since the war began.

This shortage of experienced soldiers was compounded by Ukraine’s decision to make a costly stand at Bakhmut, a battle that resulted in further heavy losses among its best troops. Although Ukraine succeeded in grinding down Russian forces in Bakhmut, the trade-off was the depletion of its own experienced personnel, leaving the country ill-prepared for the summer counteroffensive.

2. Failure to Mobilize

Another critical factor was Ukraine’s failure to launch a full-scale mobilization. While Russia’s partial mobilization in September 2022, though chaotic, produced enough manpower to hold the line, Ukraine continued to rely on volunteer fighters and a much more limited draft. Had Kyiv initiated a full-scale mobilization around the same time as Russia, it would have had tens of thousands of well-trained soldiers ready for the counteroffensive, rather than relying on fresh, minimally trained recruits.

3. Western Equipment Shortages

Despite the significant amount of military aid provided by Western nations, Ukraine’s counteroffensive was hampered by critical equipment shortages. The RUSI report emphasizes that Western nations had spent decades neglecting their militaries, resulting in limited stocks of available equipment. For example, while Ukraine received 671 tanks from its allies, only 150 were modern Western models like the Leopard 2. By comparison, Russia had over 3,000 tanks in storage that could be refurbished and sent into battle.

Moreover, the report points out that many of the donated platforms were unfamiliar to Ukrainian forces, requiring significant training time that was not available. Some equipment arrived without spare parts, and in some cases, the versions sent differed substantially from those on which Ukrainian soldiers had trained.

4. Public Disclosure of Plans

The need to generate hype about the counteroffensive also played a role in its failure. Due to leaks and Ukrainian public relations efforts, Russia was well aware of where and when the offensive was to take place. This lack of surprise gave Russia time to fortify its defenses and prepare for the Ukrainian assault, significantly reducing the chances of success.

The Myth of Air Support

A common narrative that emerged during the counteroffensive was that it failed due to a lack of air support from Western partners. While it’s true that the absence of adequate air power put Ukraine at a disadvantage, the RUSI report argues that there was no realistic way for Western powers to supply and train Ukrainian forces on advanced aircraft in time for the 2023 offensive. The report emphasizes that air support, while crucial, was not the sole factor in the counteroffensive’s failure.

The Dangers of Optimism Bias

The events of 2022, particularly Ukraine’s successful defense of Kyiv and the Kharkiv counteroffensive, led to a dangerous optimism bias among Ukraine’s leadership and its Western allies. Rather than carefully considering the challenges posed by Russia’s fortified defensive lines, the planning for the 2023 counteroffensive assumed that a massive armored assault would induce panic and lead to a collapse of Russian forces.

In reality, while there were moments of disarray among Russian troops, they quickly regrouped, and the anticipated collapse never materialized. The RUSI report notes that this overestimation of the psychological impact of the counteroffensive was a critical planning error.

The Consequences of Delayed Decisions

One of the most striking points in the RUSI report is the criticism of Western decision-makers for their delays in providing critical military aid. The indecision, particularly in Germany’s delay in sending Leopard 2 tanks, contributed to the postponement of the counteroffensive from spring to summer 2023. This delay not only affected the timing of the offensive but also had a direct impact on the outcome of battles such as Bakhmut, where Ukrainian forces made a bloody stand to convince Germany to send military aid.

The Importance of Breaching Equipment

The lack of vital breaching equipment, such as demining vehicles, was another significant factor in the counteroffensive’s failure. Despite being aware of the extensive Russian minefields, Western partners supplied only a fraction of the required demining vehicles. Those that were delivered often arrived too late to be of any use, further hampering the Ukrainian advance.

The report highlights that this shortcoming was emblematic of a broader issue: Western nations provided equipment to Ukraine in a manner that was inconsistent with NATO doctrine. The failure to supply adequate breaching equipment was a direct result of this shortsightedness, contributing to the counteroffensive’s ultimate failure.

Looking Forward

With the benefit of hindsight and the detailed analysis provided by the RUSI report, it’s clear that the 2023 summer counteroffensive was doomed by a combination of factors: a lack of experienced troops, insufficient mobilization, equipment shortages, and planning errors rooted in optimism bias. While Ukraine’s forces fought bravely, they were ultimately unable to overcome these obstacles.

As we look forward, the lessons from this failed counteroffensive are crucial for both Ukraine and its Western allies. To ensure that future operations have a better chance of success, NATO countries must be prepared to make tough decisions, including ramping up defense industrial production and providing comprehensive training and equipment support to Ukraine.

Furthermore, it’s vital that Western leaders recognize the long-term commitment required to support Ukraine. This may involve transitioning to war economies and ensuring that adequate resources are available for the duration of the conflict. The easy path of incremental support and delayed decisions has already proven costly; the harder path of full commitment may be the only way to prevent further setbacks.

Conclusion

The 2023 summer counteroffensive in Ukraine serves as a sobering reminder of the challenges of modern warfare. The lessons learned from this operation should inform future military strategies and decision-making processes, not just in Ukraine, but across NATO and its allies. As the war in Ukraine continues, it’s crucial that the international community learns from the mistakes of the past and works together to support Ukraine in its fight for sovereignty and freedom.

FAQs

1. Why did Ukraine’s 2023 summer counteroffensive fail?
   • The counteroffensive failed due to a combination of factors, including a lack of experienced troops, insufficient mobilization, equipment shortages, and planning errors influenced by optimism bias.
2. What role did Western support play in the counteroffensive?
   • Western support was crucial but insufficient. Delays in providing equipment and inadequate supplies of breaching and demining vehicles significantly hampered the counteroffensive.
3. Was the lack of air support a major factor in the counteroffensive’s failure?
   • While the lack of air support was a disadvantage, the RUSI report argues that it was not the sole or primary reason for the counteroffensive’s failure.
4. What lessons can NATO learn from the failed counteroffensive?
   • NATO can learn the importance of timely and adequate support, the need for full-scale mobilization, and the dangers of optimism bias in military planning.
5. What are the prospects for future Ukrainian counteroffensives?
   • Given the significant material losses in the 2023 counteroffensive, the prospects for a new major counteroffensive in the near future are low. The focus is likely to be on stabilizing front lines and preparing for long-term defense.