In March 2022, El Salvador initiated what would become one of the most aggressive and controversial anti-crime crackdowns in modern history. Under President Nayib Bukele’s leadership, the government suspended civil liberties, deployed military forces, and placed entire cities under siege in an uncompromising war against gangs. While the methods drew global scrutiny, the results are difficult to ignore: El Salvador’s homicide rate, once among the worst in the world, is now lower than Canada’s.
Yet despite its effectiveness, no other country has managed to replicate the Salvadoran model—despite widespread attempts. Nations like Honduras and Ecuador have tried implementing similar strategies, but with only limited or even adverse results. Why is that? What makes El Salvador’s war on gangs so uniquely successful? And what does this mean for a region plagued by cartel violence?
This blog dives deep into the Salvadoran model, its success, its limits, and why it’s not a one-size-fits-all solution.
A Country Transformed: From Murder Capital to Model of Security
Just ten years ago, El Salvador was one of the most violent countries on the planet. In 2015, it had a homicide rate of 105.2 per 100,000, far exceeding even crisis-ridden countries like Haiti. Fast forward to 2024, and the transformation is almost surreal: 1.9 homicides per 100,000—a figure on par with Canada and lower than many EU nations.
That stunning drop wasn’t gradual. It came after a sudden, forceful pivot: a state of emergency declared in March 2022, following a weekend that saw nearly 90 gang-related murders. From there, Bukele launched an all-out war on the gangs—deploying soldiers, suspending rights, and imprisoning over 80,000 people, many with minimal due process.
By the end of 2024, El Salvador had gone from one of the most dangerous nations on Earth to one of the safest in the Western Hemisphere.
The Flip Side: Civil Liberties and Due Process Suspended
The price of security has been steep. Civil liberties were curtailed. Entire neighborhoods were locked down. People were arrested without warrants, often on flimsy or anonymous accusations. As of today, El Salvador jails a higher proportion of its population than any country on Earth.
Critics—both domestic and international—have called out the government’s harsh tactics, comparing them to authoritarian overreach. But to many Salvadorans, the reduction in violence has justified the measures. Bukele remains the most popular leader in Latin America.
Why Other Countries Can’t Copy the Bukele Model
Despite its apparent success, no other nation has been able to replicate El Salvador’s methods with similar results. Honduras and Ecuador, the two most prominent followers of the Bukele blueprint, saw only modest gains—or, in Ecuador’s case, a reversal of early improvements.
So, why does Bukele’s model work only in El Salvador?
Here are the critical and largely unrepeatable factors:
1. High Police and Military Density
At the start of the crackdown, El Salvador had 418 police officers per 100,000 residents, bolstered by significant military investments. By contrast, Honduras had only 184 per 100,000, far below even peaceful countries like Iceland or Austria.
Without enough boots on the ground, enforcement of a massive anti-gang operation becomes impractical, no matter how tough the laws are.
2. Weak, Localized Gangs
El Salvador’s main gangs—MS-13 and Barrio 18—were localized and financially weak. MS-13, for instance, made only about $31 million a year, with individual members earning as little as $65/month. Their operations were limited primarily to dense urban neighborhoods.
This allowed Salvadoran forces to isolate and neutralize gangs efficiently through house-to-house searches and citywide lockdowns.
3. The Element of Surprise
El Salvador’s crackdown was sudden. Gangs weren’t prepared. The government acted immediately after a massacre weekend, catching criminal networks off-guard.
Contrast this with Ecuador, where gangs struck first—coordinating jailbreaks, car bombings, and even taking a TV crew hostage. By the time the state responded, the gangs were already entrenched and ready for battle.
4. Secure, Isolated Prisons
El Salvador had been isolating gang leaders in prison since 2016, long before Bukele’s mega-prison was built. Inmates couldn’t communicate, coordinate, or run operations from behind bars—a rarity in Latin America.
Ecuador tried the same approach, but gangs quickly regained control of prison rackets, even under military oversight.
5. Less Systemic Corruption
El Salvador is corrupt—but differently. While shady procurement deals and lack of transparency persist, gangs have not captured the state as they have in Honduras or Ecuador.
In Honduras, former President Juan Orlando Hernández was convicted of aiding drug traffickers. In Ecuador, gangs have reportedly infiltrated the judiciary, military, and political elite—with assassinations of officials who wouldn’t cooperate.
6. Pre-existing Intelligence from Past Deals
Before the 2022 crackdown, the Salvadoran government had allegedly negotiated secretly with gangs to reduce violence. This shady pact gave the state valuable intelligence, including databases of gang members.
That data helped make the crackdown precise. Other nations didn’t have that inside knowledge—because either their governments were working for the gangs, or had no pre-existing relationship at all.
7. Total Political Control
Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party held a supermajority in the legislature, control of the Supreme Court, and near-complete dominance of the government when the crackdown began.
Compare this to Ecuador, where President Daniel Noboa faces a divided legislature and an unstable political environment. He doesn’t have the same grip on the reins of power.
8. Economic Gamble Backed by Luck
El Salvador funded its war on gangs through high-interest loans. The financial gamble nearly pushed the country into default, but a well-timed IMF loan agreement in 2024 kept the country afloat.
Maintaining mega-prisons, deploying the military, and conducting mass arrests is expensive. Most Latin American countries can’t afford it without risking economic collapse.
The Honduran and Ecuadorian Attempts: A Closer Look
Ecuador: A Flash of Hope, Then Collapse
After declaring a state of internal armed conflict in early 2024, Ecuador saw a short-lived drop in crime. But the success didn’t last. By January 2025, murders rose 37% year-over-year—the worst month in the country’s history. Gangs fragmented, reorganized, and continued their assault on civil society.
Honduras: Some Gains, Many Setbacks
Honduras saw its homicide rate fall from 35.8 to 25.3 per 100,000, a positive trend—but nowhere near El Salvador’s drop. Extortion and gang control in poor neighborhoods remained high, indicating that the government’s efforts had limited reach.
Conclusion: No Easy Answers
El Salvador’s gang war worked not just because of political will or public support—but because of a perfect storm of advantages. From prison policy to police strength, from political dominance to geographic luck, the Salvadoran government fought gangs from a position of relative strength.
That doesn’t mean other countries are doomed to fail. But it does mean there’s no universal template. Each nation must tailor its anti-gang strategy to its own realities: police capacity, institutional integrity, economic resources, and political cohesion.
The takeaway? Sometimes, even success can’t be copied.
FAQ: El Salvador’s Crackdown
Q: What is “Mano Dura”?
A: Spanish for “iron fist,” it refers to harsh, military-style crackdowns on crime common in Latin America.
Q: How many people have been arrested during El Salvador’s crackdown?
A: Over 80,000 people have been imprisoned since March 2022.
Q: Is El Salvador’s homicide rate really lower than Canada’s?
A: Officially yes—1.9 vs. 1.94 per 100,000—though measurement standards differ, and some critics argue the Salvadoran figure undercounts.
Q: What are the criticisms of Bukele’s model?
A: Human rights violations, lack of due process, indefinite detentions, and concerns over authoritarianism.
Q: Can other countries replicate El Salvador’s success?
A: Not easily. Unique factors like gang weakness, intelligence access, political control, and pre-existing prison reforms are hard to copy.
